

Preventing Post-Election Violence Based on the Kenyan Experience

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March 13, 2015

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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2011, President Obama publicly declared, “preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the United States of America.”¹ A year later, he approved the recommendations of a Presidential Study (PSD-10) focused on ways to enhance the U.S. government’s capacity to do so, including the establishment of the Atrocities Prevention Board (APB). As the APB marks three years of operation, it offers a good opportunity to take stock of the Board’s performance to date in spearheading a robust U.S. policy to effectively prevent and respond to atrocities, in order to glean lessons learned and develop concrete recommendations for future action.

The United States government’s engagement in Kenya around the most recent national elections offers a useful case study. On March 4, 2013, Kenyans went to the polls for first time since widespread violence erupted following the disputed 2007 presidential election, leading to the death of approximately 1,200 and the displacement of an additional 650,000 people. The United States—in step with the international community, Kenyan institutions and local organizations—responded with unprecedented diplomacy and programming during the inter-election period aimed at preventing a reprise of the 2007/08 tragedy. While the lead up to the 2013 elections was not without conflict, mass atrocities were avoided.

According to the National Democratic Institute, thirty African countries—many, like Kenya, with a history of political violence—are slated to hold elections between now and 2016.² Kenya itself will return to the polls in 2017, and despite the relative calm surrounding the 2013 polls, future peaceful elections are by no means guaranteed. If not managed properly, these elections can inflame longstanding grievances and sectarian tensions, serving as a flash point for violence. Fortunately though, elections offer promising opportunities to engage in deliberative preventative action, as they are scheduled well in advance. Yet all too often the international community mobilizes mere months out from Election Day with a disproportionate focus on technical support to the electoral process at the expense of efforts aimed at addressing the underlying causes of political violence. The Kenya experience provides an occasion to distill a set of best practices and lessons learned that can inform future programming there as well as in other similarly at-risk countries on the continent in advance of anticipated trigger events for atrocities, such as national elections.

This analysis undertakes an inventory of the various programs implemented by intergovernmental, governmental, and non-governmental actors in Kenya in the run-up to the 2013 elections, supplemented by key stakeholder interviews, in order to identify what worked, as well as gaps in the interventions deployed, breakdowns in coordination, and other failings. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. **Section II** provides background on the Kenya experience. **Section III** introduces the paper’s methodology. **Section IV** describes our programming inventory while **Section V** details the key findings from our corresponding gap analysis and key informant interviews. **Section VI** presents a set of best practices and lessons learned for the Atrocities Prevention Board and other U.S. government actors for Kenya specifically as well as other at-risk countries on the continent and elsewhere.

¹ White House (August 4, 2011)

² NDI (September 25, 2014)

II. THE KENYA EXPERIENCE

1. The History & Major Drivers of Electoral Violence in Kenya

Electoral violence, usually perpetrated along ethnic lines, has been commonplace in Kenya since the introduction of multi-party politics in 1991. In the run-up to the 1992 elections, clashes between supporters of the ruling Kalenjin-dominated Kenya African National Union (KANU) and members of ‘pro-opposition’ ethnic groups killed 779 and displaced more than 56,000.³ Similarly, in the lead-up to the 1997 polls, KANU supporters attacked ‘outsider’ ethnic groups in Coast province. Following the elections, they clashed with armed Kikuyu communities in Rift Valley, causing the death of more than 200 and the displacement of more than 100,000.⁴ Comparatively speaking, very little political violence accompanied the 2002 polls, despite the fact that KANU was voted out of office for the first time. However, scholars largely attribute this to a number of political factors rather than any real mitigation of prevailing conflict dynamics. In particular, the Kikuyu-dominated National Alliance of Kenya (NAK) and the Luo-dominated Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had previously been at odds, decided to unite and share power under a National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) with Mwai Kibaki as a single presidential candidate. This union enabled a political contest that did not clearly follow ethnic lines as the two main presidential candidates were both Kikuyu.⁵



Figure 1: History of Electoral Violence in Kenya (generated by authors based on data from Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence report)

The Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (2009) that investigated Kenya’s 2007/08 post-election violence attributed the country’s history of electoral violence to a combination of long-standing conflict drivers.

First is the perception of historic marginalization by certain ethnic groups as a consequence of alleged inequalities associated with the allocation of resources—in particular, land. The fact that many areas outside of major cities and towns are fairly ethnically homogenous has created a notion of “insiders” who are native to a particular province and “outsiders” who migrated there. These migration patterns allowed the misallocation or unequal of resources to be viewed in ethnic terms. Following independence, public land has regularly been used as a tool of patronage by the country’s political elite to secure support from their own ethnic groups. Kikuyus, the ethnic group of Kenya’s first president, have been a primary beneficiary of this patronage, even in areas outside of their “native” region of Central province. Non-Kikuyu politicians have used this long-standing grievance to manipulate public perception and encourage violence along ethnic lines.

³ Hansen (2009)

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Ibid, Brown (2009), Halakhe (2013)

Second is a system of governance based on highly centralized and personalized executive power. The president and his ruling circle have historically maintained enormous control over the institutions that would normally serve as checks and balances, including the judiciary and legislature, as well as the police. Consequently, these institutions are perceived as lacking independence and integrity. Furthermore, the acquisition of political power is seen as a zero-sum game in which one's own tribe must hold the presidency in order to benefit from state resources.

Third is the longstanding problem of high youth unemployment. It is estimated that two million youth are unemployed in Kenya. A growing number of these young people are university educated; their underemployment is a consequence of the slow pace of job creation in the country. With little hope of formal sector employment, youth gangs and militias have proliferated throughout the country, offering an avenue for informal employment and income opportunities. Politicians have mobilized these groups as the primary perpetrators of electoral violence.

Fourth is an entrenched culture of impunity. Despite Kenya's history of electoral and other sectarian violence, the country has failed to bring to justice any of those responsible for prior abuses. This is despite reports issued by two government Inquiries—the Kiliku Parliamentary Committee (1992) and the Akiwumi Commission (1997)—that explicitly name perpetrators and recommend investigations.⁶ Consequently, individuals intent on using violence to influence election politics commit violent acts with the knowledge that is unlikely they will ever be held accountable.

2. The 2007 Elections & Post-Election Violence

These long-standing conflict drivers remained well-established as the 2007 election approached, notwithstanding the relative peace of the 2002 elections. In addition, the political dynamics in the run-up to the 2007 elections remained in flux. The National Rainbow Coalition collapsed only a few months after its victory in 2002 when promised post-electoral power-sharing reforms failed to materialize. The LDP, led by Raila Odinga, broke away and merged with KANU to form the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). This combination of Luo and Kalenjin constituencies created a formidable opposition to Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU).⁷

Various forms of incendiary speech were prominent throughout the campaign period. Both parties traded inflammatory statements against individual politicians and their affiliated parties as well as against particular ethnic groups. These were disseminated widely through public speeches, flyers, posters, SMS, email and, in particular, vernacular radio.⁸ Call-in shows were particularly problematic as they allowed individuals to make unregulated hateful statements with no right of reply.⁹ There is also some evidence of religious leaders using the pulpit to convey messages amounting to hate speech and incitement.¹⁰

⁶ Human Rights Watch (2008)

⁷ Halakhe (2013)

⁸ Benesch (2013)

⁹ Waki Commission (2008)

¹⁰ Ibid.

Election Day itself, December 27, was relatively peaceful. The Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) released results on Kenya's constituencies as they received them. These revealed Odinga holding a strong lead the day after the election, but no definitive winner. Suspicions of fraud grew as the apparent gap between the two candidates narrowed and the ECK continued to delay announcement of final results. On the morning of December 30, Odinga held a press conference accusing the ECK of doctoring the results and demanding a recount. He also stated that he would not seek the intervention of "the courts controlled by President Kibaki."¹¹ Despite these strong allegations of irregularities, the ECK declared Kibaki the winner that evening by about 232,000 votes, and the president was hastily sworn in an hour later.¹²

Within moments of the final results being announced, violence erupted in several opposition strongholds—Nairobi's slum of Kibera, Kisumu in Nyanza province, and on a large scale in Rift Valley. At first, the violence seemed spontaneous, largely stemming from the anger of ODM supporters at what they perceived to be a stolen election. However, it soon became apparent that much of it was organized along ethnic lines.¹³ Violence in Rift Valley, particularly around Eldoret, largely took the form of attacks perpetrated by Kalenjin ODM supporters systematically targeting perceived PNU supporters, predominantly from the Kikuyu, Kamba and Kisii ethnic groups.¹⁴ In response, Kikuyu youths formed so-called 'self-defense forces.' These militias, along with the Mungiki sect—a criminal organization formed in the 1980s—carried out organized and large-scale violence against perceived ODM supporters, predominantly from the Luo and Kalenjin ethnic groups, in Naivasha, Nakuru, and the slums of Nairobi.¹⁵ All-together, it is estimated that approximately 1,200 Kenyans died in the post-election violence, and an additional 650,000 were displaced. Tens of thousands of houses and businesses were looted or destroyed.¹⁶

¹¹ Ndegwa (December 30, 2007)

¹² Dercon and Gutierrez-Romero (2010)

¹³ Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (2009)

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.




Figure 2: 2007/08 Post-Election Violence (generated by authors based on data from Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence report).

Regional and international actors were quick to respond. The international community backed an African Union (AU) Panel of Eminent African Personalities mediation process, chaired by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. Fifteen bilateral donors adopted a “business not as usual” stance with the Kenyan government until a political settlement was reached, which included threats of aid cuts as well as travel bans and targeted sanctions on elites who were thwarting the mediation.¹⁷ After nearly 40 days of mediation, the violence finally ended on February 28 with the signing of an “Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition Government.” The two parties agreed to end the violence, address the humanitarian situation, and resolve the political crisis through the passage of a National Accord and Reconciliation Act (2008), which created a Government of National Unity in which Kibaki remained President and Odinga assumed a new position of Prime Minister. The parties also agreed to examine the long-term underlying drivers of the conflict under Agenda 4 of the National Accord and establish an Independent Review Commission on the 2007 Elections (the Kriegler Commission) and a Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (the Waki Commission), and a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission.¹⁸ The Government of National Unity was formed in mid-April, and in July an Implementation Framework for addressing these underlying drivers was established.

3. The Inter-Election Period

The signing of the National Accord prompted inter-governmental, governmental, and non-governmental actors in Kenya to undertake robust programming to assist the Kenyan government in carrying out this Implementation Framework to avoid a return to violence around the next scheduled general elections in 2013. This included investments in new

¹⁷ Kanyinga and Walker (2012)

¹⁸ The National Accord and Reconciliation Act (2008)

technology, early warning/early response (EWER) systems, peace messaging and capacity building for the county's dispute resolution infrastructure (including a newly established National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC)), and local District Peace Committees (DPCs). Considerable attention was also paid to promoting responsible journalism and finding innovative ways to engage youth and dissuade them from perpetuating violence.

A successful 2010 referendum resulted in the adoption of a reformed Constitution that reduced the power of the President; strengthened the independence of the judiciary, police, and election commission; and laid the foundation for more decentralized governance. A National Cohesion and Integration Act established laws on ethnic discrimination, created penalties for hate speech, and established the NCIC. A highly regarded human rights activist, Willy Mutunga, was appointed as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, further strengthening public confidence in the judiciary.

As the 2013 elections grew closer, attention became increasingly focused on reducing the risk of the election process becoming a trigger for violence. Considerable technical and financial support went towards capacity-building of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IBEC) and domestic observers as well as to providing voter education. The United States, Kenya's largest bilateral donor, provided more than \$150 million in support of programming to prevent and mitigate conflict, advance reforms, and hold credible elections during the five-year period preceding the 2013 polls.¹⁹ The election itself cost nearly \$300 million to conduct, with the international community contributing approximately one-third of that cost.²⁰

Against the background of all of this activity, the Waki Commission submitted its report and recommendations to President Kibaki on October 15, 2008. The recommendations included the establishment of a special tribunal to prosecute perpetrators of the post-election violence. The report also stated that if the tribunal was not set up within six months, information collected by the Commission would be passed to the International Criminal Court (ICC), including a sealed envelope containing the names of those suspected to be most responsible for the violence.²¹ A bill to establish the special tribunal was introduced in parliament twice, and on both occasions failed to pass. Accordingly, on July 16, 2009, Kofi Annan passed the sealed envelope to then-ICC chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, and on December 15, 2010, Moreno-Ocampo requested the 'issuance of summonses to appear' for six people for their alleged commission of crimes against humanity in 2007/8. These charges were confirmed against four individuals in 2011. The two most prominent of the accused were Uhuru Kenyatta (then deputy prime minister and son of Kenya's first president) and William Ruto (former agriculture and higher education minister).

4. The 2013 Elections

On March 4, 2013, Kenyans again went to the polls. As in 2007, the presidential race was highly contested. Eight candidates were listed on the ballot, but the race would ultimately come down to one between Odinga and Kenyatta. Despite the ambitious atrocity prevention agenda undertaken during the inter-election period, the risk of electoral violence was still high.

¹⁹ USAID (2014)

²⁰ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (2013)

²¹ Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (2009)

According to Human Rights Watch (2013), pre-election violence in Coast, Eastern, and North Eastern provinces resulted in the death of more than 477 people and displaced an additional 118,000. In a late development with significant implications for potential election violence, Kenyatta and fellow ICC indictee William Ruto joined forces in December 2012 to form the Jubilee Coalition. This ticket brought together Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities, the two ethnic groups between which the 2007-08 violence had been the most devastating.

Turnout was the largest in history, with 86% of registered voters going to the polls.²² There were no serious incidents of violence on polling day itself, and the electoral process was deemed by international observers to be free, fair, and credible.²³ This is not to say there weren't challenges. Insufficient voter education led to an unprecedented number of rejected votes. Furthermore, lack of cellular coverage at some polling stations led to the breakdown of electronic transmission of results. The IEBC was forced to revert back to the manual tallying system that many believed enabled a fraudulent result in 2007, but the reversion did not compromise the integrity of the process as it had then.²⁴

On March 9, the IEBC declared Kenyatta and Ruto the winners with over 50.07% of the vote, only 8,000 more votes than were required to avoid a run-off.²⁵ Many had anticipated a presidential run-off, but Kenyatta and Ruto joining forces allowed Jubilee to secure the requisite amount of support. The ICC cases against the two also forged solidarity amongst their previously antagonistic communities. Odinga, who received 43% of the vote, challenged the results. However this time, his party went to court instead of the streets. Although it conceded some irregularities, on March 31, 2013, the Supreme Court of Kenya upheld the election outcome—a ruling that Odinga accepted. On April 9, Kenyatta and Ruto were sworn in to office. Mass violence had been avoided, and the international community lauded the 2013 elections a success.

III. METHODOLOGY

To identify a set of best practices and lessons learned based on the Kenyan experience that can inform future programming in other similarly at-risk countries on the continent in advance of anticipated trigger events for atrocities, the team utilized a qualitatively-focused mixed methods approach consisting of (1) a desk review of relevant primary and secondary documents; (2) a program inventory; and (3) key stakeholder interviews. Taken together, our mixed methods approach provided a comprehensive understanding of what worked in Kenya.

1. Desk Review

A wide variety of primary and secondary source documents were reviewed by the team - namely individual donor strategies, project descriptions, mid-term and final internal and external project and portfolio evaluations – as well as published best practices analyses by governmental and non-governmental entities.

²² International Crisis Group (2013)

²³ Ibid

²⁴ Ibid

²⁵ Ibid.

2. Program Inventory

Based on information gained during the desk review, an inventory was prepared of the various programs implemented by intergovernmental, governmental, and non-governmental actors in Kenya in the run-up to the 2013 elections. In consultation with the client, relevant programming was identified as that which fell under at least one of three themes – (1) prevent and mitigate conflict; (2) hold credible, transparent, and peaceful elections; and (3) advance reforms – in line with the U.S. government’s “Strategic Plan” for this period. Relevant information compiled for each program included implementing or recipient organizations, funding agencies, implementation period, level of funding, geographic scope, and key objectives, so as to generate the most comprehensive overview of the interventions deployed.

After further consultation with the client, it was recommended that programming falling under the third theme (advance reforms) be excluded from this analysis in order to focus on efforts aimed at eliminating the immediate causes of post-election violence. The longer time horizon for these sorts of efforts meant that it was more difficult to conceptualize them as exclusively focused on preventing post-election violence. Programs falling under the remaining two themes were further subdivided into sub-themes, in line with U.S. government-commissioned evaluations, in order to more adequately assess where there may have been gaps.

3. Key Stakeholder Interviews

Based upon the results of our program inventory, we identified a set of key stakeholders in Washington, D.C. and Nairobi for structured in-depth interviews. In total, the team interviewed more than 50 individuals, representing donor agencies, implementing partners, and local organizations.²⁶ Information obtained through these interviews supplemented our understanding of the interventions deployed and the challenges associated with achieving effective coordination, addressing in-country needs, and engaging in efficient program implementation.

IV. PROGRAM MAPPING

This section summarizes findings from the mapping: the number of implemented projects, the key donors and implementers, the time frame and level of funding, and the thematic and geographic scope.²⁷

1. Time Frame of Projects

Based on open sources, we identified 38 projects—many with multiple components—focused on (1) preventing and mitigating conflict; or (2) holding credible, transparent, and peaceful elections implemented in the inter-election period between the 2007 and the 2013 elections. While duration of 10 was not available, 12 projects had the time frame of around two years, 10 had more than three years, and six lasted around one year in writing. More than half (20) of the projects started in 2010 and later, and a majority were initiated only six months to a year before the elections. A mere seven projects extended beyond the 2013 elections and all wrapped up

²⁶ See ANNEX 1 for a detailed list of organizations interviewed.

²⁷ See ANNEX 2 and ANNEX 3 for a comprehensive summary of the overall inventory based on open source information.

by 2015. Projects related to conflict management tended to have a longer time span. Only two projects - the Kenya Transformation Initiative I and USAID's Kenya Election and the Political Process Strengthening Program - lasted for more than two years in the election management category.

2. Donors and Funding

The projects were funded by 10 donor countries: the United States, Britain, Norway, Sweden, Canada, the European Union, Denmark, Netherlands, Finland, and Italy. Multilateral donor organizations included the United Nations Development Program. USAID, being the largest donor, funded 12 projects covered by our mapping. UKAID (then DFID), which funded 9 projects, was second. The third largest donor was the UNDP. UNDP was also a major implementer and coordinator of a multi-donor Elections Basket Fund that provided technical assistance to the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission.

The amount of funding provided by donors for individual programs ranged approximately from \$20,000 to \$35 million U.S. dollars.²⁸ There is very limited information available in public sources on the precise funding mechanism employed, which would address the allocation of funding to implementers, the allocation of funding in the time frame, and the components of the basket fund.

3. Implementers

More than 40 organizations—including state agencies, IGOs, INGOs, and NGOs—implemented the projects in question. Kenyan state agencies included the National Steering Committee (NSC) of the Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security, the Office of the President, and the National Secretariat of Conflict Management and Peace Building. The most prominent IGO was UNDP, whereas there were numerous INGOs involved such as Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) and Chemonics International. While open sources do not reflect the reasons donors chose specific actors to implement projects, interview findings shed light on this decision-making.

4. Geographic Scope

Most projects' geographic coverage was defined as nationwide in project description documents, covering all eight regions of Kenya, or was not identified. However, many projects focused on 'hot spots' where violence had been most prevalent in 2007/8, in particular, the Rift Valley, Nyanza, and Nairobi. Many projects concentrated in Nairobi, reflecting the fact that that many embassies and state agencies are stationed there.

5. Thematic Scope

Out of the 38 projects, 21 were dedicated to preventing and mitigating conflict and 19 were focused on holding credible, transparent, and peaceful elections. The Kenya Transformation Initiative (KTI) I and II, both led by USAID, were classified as falling under both themes. KTI was a massive project with some assistance aimed at reducing tensions and enabling economic,

²⁸ It should be noted that this level of funding does not reflect the different currencies utilized by the donor countries, who provide statistics based on their own currencies, and is not adjusted for inflation.

political, and social recovery, and other assistance geared toward renewing the nation's confidence in the elections and capacity to address instability, political marginalization, and violence.²⁹ A majority (27) of the projects also had multiple and cross-cutting components and dealt with more than one sub-theme.

A. Preventing & Mitigating Conflict: Of the 21 projects addressing the prevention and mitigation of conflict, 10 focused on Early Warning Early Response (EWER); 10 on Deterring Spoilers, 7 on Peace Messaging, 13 on Community Dialogue and Reconciliation, 5 on Hate Speech Monitoring, and 13 on Capacitating Local Peace Structures.

(i) Hate speech monitoring: Programming falling under this sub-category focused on countering dangerous speech, cited as a key contributor to the 2007/08 violence. This included UNDP supporting the newly established National Cohesion and Integration Commission in fulfilling its mandate as the public watchdog for hate speech, iHub monitoring incidents of hate speech online and Internews providing journalists with skills in conflict-sensitive reporting.

(ii) Peace Messaging: Programming falling under this sub-category focused on imploring Kenyans to maintain peace, calm, and unity before, during and after the elections. This included developing and disseminating messages of peace through SMS and email blasts, door-to-door campaigns, TV and radio, community events, billboards, etc.”³⁰

(iii) Community Dialogue and Reconciliation: Programming falling under this sub-category focused on reducing tensions and improving relationships between previously polarized ethnic communities. Programs such as “Kenya Tuna Uwezo” and the “People to People Peace Project (3Ps)” had a people-to-people approach and utilized civil society organizations, discussion groups and peace committees to start dialogue and build up communication and trust. The “Picha Mtaani” project and others also used peace caravans to tour communities hit by post-election violence to initiate dialogue by gallery displays.

(iv) Capacitating Local Peace Structures: Programming falling under this sub-category focused on the development of Kenya's peace infrastructure. This included UNDP strengthening the conflict management capacity of the National Steering Committee (NSC) on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, establishing District Committees (DPCs) at the local level tasked with “emphasizing dialogue, promoting mutual understanding, building trust and creating constructive problem-solving and joint action to prevent violence,”³¹ and Pact strengthening the capacity of local organizations to undertake conflict mitigation activities like peace meetings.

(v) Early Warning Early Response (EWER): Programming falling under this sub-category focused on raising alarm about potential threats of violence and undertaking effective measures to address these threats before they escalate. This involved mechanisms operating at both the national and local level. The national Uwiano Platform for Peace, largely funded by UNDP, recruited and trained more than 100 peace monitors and set up “Peace Tents” in about 20 counties to coordinate information sharing on emerging threats and response by state and non-

²⁹ Kenya Transformation Initiative, DAI <<http://dai.com/our-work/projects/kenya%E2%80%94transition-initiative-program-kti>>

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ UNDP, “An Architecture for Building Peace at the Local Level,” http://www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources-conflict/pdfs/UNDP_Local%20Peace%20Committees_2011.pdf

state actors, including security alerts to police, conflict mediation by elders and peace committees.”³² Uchaguzi, provided a crowdsourcing platform for Kenyans to report potential election-related violence via SMS that was linked to emergency responders. Safe Coast provided local-level EWER in the Coast region.

(vi) Deterring Spoilers: Programming under this sub-category focused on identifying potential spoilers - individuals intent on exploiting local tensions and blocking reconciliation efforts in pursuit of their own political or economic interests – and cutting off such movements. This included a \$55 million Yes Youth Can! (YYC) program that sought to reduce the ability of potential spoilers to mobilize young people by organizing youth into village and county-level groups called “bunges” (Kiswahili for “parliaments”) for income-generating activities and community service. The US Department of State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) deployed field officers outside of Nairobi to identify potential spoilers in hotspots, like members of the secessionist Mombasa Republican Council or boda-boda drivers, and incorporate them into peace activities.³³

b. Hold Credible, Transparent, and Peaceful Elections: 19 projects addressed to the electoral process directly. 13 projects had Civic and Voter Education components, 5 dealt with Professionalizing Political Parties, 10 focused on Capacity-Building of Election Management Body, and 8 engaged in Election Observation.

(i) Capacity-Building of the Election Management Body: Programming under this sub-category focused on supporting the newly created Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) to deliver free, fair and credible elections in 2013. Support was primarily channeled through a multi-donor basket fund managed by UNDP that built the IEBC’s capacity in voter registration, voter education, results transmission and dispute resolution. This involved the deployment of new forms of election technology, including biometric voter registration and electronic results transmission systems, as well as the training of over 250,000 polling officials.³⁴

(ii) Civic and Voter Education: Programming under this sub-category focused on making Kenyans aware of their voting rights, in terms of eligibility, and the voting and registration procedures. The theory was that the more Kenyans are aware of their rights, the greater the turnout will be and the better democracy will function. This included the Uchaguzi Bora initiative, implemented by Uraia Trust, which trained and deployed civic educators and disseminated a national civic education curriculum on voting processes and devolution. In addition, the Uongozi 2012 Campaign implemented by Inuka Kenya Trust produced a fourteen-part reality show depicting a mock election coupled with traveling roadshows aimed at mobilizing young Kenyans to register to vote.

(iii) Election Observation: Programming under this sub-category focused on building public confidence in the electoral process and helping to deter fraud, intimidation and violence. Various observers participated in in the Kenyan elections, such as the EU and the Carter

³²<http://www.ke.undp.org/content/kenya/en/home/operations/projects/peacebuilding/districtpeace.html>

³³ Social Impact, US Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) , Final Evaluation of CSO’s Kenya Engagement (February 2012-April 2013), December 2013

³⁴ USAID, <http://www.usaid.gov/kenya/fact-sheets/support-electoral-reforms-and-processes-kenya>

Center.³⁵ The domestic Elections Observation Group (ELOG), a permanent national platform composed of civil society and faith-based organizations committed to promote citizen participation in the electoral process deployed approximately 1000 Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) observers in sampled polling stations.³⁶

(iv) Professionalizing Political Parties: Programming under this sub-category focused on coalition building and inter-party dialogue as well as political inclusion of marginalized groups. This included NDI establishing an Inter-Party Youth Forum, political party liaison committees (PPLC) in each of the 47 countries to improve communication between party leadership and the IEBC, and a Leadership and Campaign Academy to equip candidates with the skills to run successful campaigns.

VI. KEY FINDINGS

1. Effectiveness of Programming

A. Geographic Coverage

Atrocity prevention programming heavily concentrated on 2007/08 “hotspots” that diminished in importance as the 2013 elections approached. Analysis in the wake of the PEV identified the Rift Valley, Nyanza, and Nairobi slums as priority hotspots for 2013 likely to produce localized violence that might spread. Consequently, a massive investment was made in these areas, and in particular with programs aimed at communities where the Kikuyu-Kalenjin conflict was most pronounced. However, conflict dynamics were considerably different once the Jubilee Alliance formed in late-2012, making Kikuyu-Kalenjin violence much less likely. At this point, it was difficult for donors to adjust their programming or redeploy it elsewhere, and the Rift Valley remained saturated with peace messaging. According to one donor, “a lot of the peace-building activities in the Rift Valley conducted after the formation of the Jubilee Alliance were not needed.” In other words, these programmatic efforts were fighting the last war, rather than adapting to current conflict dynamics. One exception to this appeared to be S/CSO, which was able to remain flexible enough to pivot (e.g. to Kisumu) in response to updated analysis it was conducting at the sub-national level.

More remote northern areas where inter-communal competition over access to natural resources involving pastoralist communities had been increasingly fierce received considerably less attention than they warranted. Emergent risk areas cited by interviewees include Turkana, Tana River, Eastern and North Eastern regions, all which experienced some degree of pre-election violence in 2013. While these incidents were not necessarily directly connected to national politics, local candidates used them to entrench their ethnic support. In North Eastern in particular, tensions were further exacerbated by al-Shabaab attacks and the subsequent use of excessive force and other abuses by Kenyan military and police. According to the Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, these were also areas identified by the Kenyan National Intelligence and Security Service as high risk in the lead up to the elections.³⁷

³⁵ Carter Center, http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/kenya-final-101613.pdf

³⁶ ELOG, <https://www.ndi.org/files/Kenya-ELOG-PVT-statement-030913.pdf>

³⁷ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (February 11, 2013).

Generally speaking, potential hotspots for violence were more numerous in 2013 than they were in 2007, due to devolved competition for power within communities and the redrawing of electoral boundaries, which altered the ethnic composition of certain constituencies. As one interviewee stated, “we had a better idea of what the hotspots were in 2010 than we did in 2013.”

Civic and voter education and peace messaging did not reach far enough into the grassroots. Several interviewees indicated that civic voter education and the “One Kenya” campaign had trouble reaching Kenyans in villages outside Nairobi. One interviewee indicated that gaps in messaging were filled by the church or local MPs who were preaching less unifying messages. Those in rural areas were further unable to access messaging that was not disseminated in the local vernacular or through the more accessible means of radio broadcasting.

B. Thematic Coverage

Supporting the passage of Kenya’s 2010 Constitution, the reform of the judiciary, a new election commission, and devolution were key interventions during the inter-election period that contributed to preventing atrocities in 2013. Although eliminated from our program inventory, it was clear during interviews that initial support for advancing reforms was critical for avoiding violence after the 2013 polls. Several interviewees referred to the new Constitution as “Kenya’s peace agreement.” The altered configuration of political power brought about by devolution made elections less of a “winner-take-all” contest by offering opportunities at the sub-national level. In fact, the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD) won more governor seats than the Jubilee Alliance. Furthermore, the establishment of a new judiciary and election commission (IEBC) increased public confidence in these institutions, which was critical for refraining from violence. The most significant example of this was Odinga’s decision to dispute the results in court and then to respect the ruling.

Comprehensive civic and voter education was seen as a major programmatic gap. A number of interviewees pointed to civic education as a key programmatic area that could have minimized the trade off between peace and democracy. However, serious delays in getting educative materials out and approval of donor funding complicated the process. Comprehensive civic and voter education was especially important in the lead-up to 2013 due to the fact that the election were the most complex ever held in Kenya and involved ballots for six different positions, three of which were completely new. The long lines and time lags that emerged as a result raised rigging concerns.

The response element of national-level EWER was insufficient. The international community invested significantly in developing a number of EWER systems at the national and local levels. While interviewees were generally positive about the effectiveness of the “warning” aspect, the same was not true for “response.” According to interviewees, incidents reported to national-level EWER platforms often resulted in a police response time of upward of three weeks, which undermined confidence in the system. As one interviewee indicated, lags in verification, lack of police training in addressing human rights concerns, and allegations of corruption meant “responses take longer to mobilize, while the facts on the ground continue to evolve.” More community-level systems supported by donors, like the Safe Coast Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism (SCEWER) that relied on relationships with local peace structures were reportedly more effective but largely disconnected from national platforms.

Programming aimed at long-term conflict mitigation fell short. According to interviewees, land reform languished after the establishment of the National Land Commission. In addition, a key fourth piece of enabling legislation (The Community Land Bill) is still pending. Similarly, despite starting a judicial reform process, little progress was made towards realizing domestic accountability for the 2007/08 post-election violence or implementing the recommendations of the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission, whose final report continues to languish in Parliament. Implementation of security sector reforms was also limited. While youth empowerment programs (e.g. Yes Youth Can!) mobilized young people to engage positively in the elections, they did not address the key hurdles associated with entrenched youth un- and underemployment.

ICC witness protection was another major gap. A number of witnesses recanted their testimony or pulled out of the Kenyan cases before the ICC during this period due to failure on the part of the ICC to provide adequate protection. AID/OTI was forced to take this on through its KTI program, but found that few other donors, other than Sweden and Finland lately, were willing to support that cause.

C. Preventing a Reprisal of the 2007/08 PEV

There was not a reoccurrence of mass violence in 2013, but many interlocutors largely attribute this to contextual factors versus programming. Interviewees indicated that tensions around the polls remained consistently high. Furthermore, while hate speech was largely curtailed in traditional media, interviewees indicated that it was rampant on social media. Such speech was without consequence. According to one interviewee, “Kenyans weren’t violent in 2013 but there were plenty of opportunities to be.” On the diplomatic front, donors believed that strategic political messaging like Obama’s “take it to the courts” and intensive shuttle diplomacy with the message “if you whip up violence there will be consequences” played an important deterrent function in the lead up to 2013.

D. Truly Mitigating Violence by Addressing Core Grievances

Underlying grievances behind the atrocities in 2007-08 remain largely unaddressed. Early mobilization by the donor community, international implementers, local organization, and the Government of Kenya to advance institutional reforms resulted in a solid infrastructure for long-term conflict mitigation. This included a clear roadmap for peace with Agenda 4, a new constitution and enabling legislation. That said, interviewees were unanimous in the opinion that critical parts of the reform agenda aimed at long-term conflict mitigation remain unaddressed. Furthermore, interviewees indicated that no one is talking about these issues at present. While donors went into this inter-election period saying, “Kenya needs real peace,” including long-term reforms aimed at conflict prevention, interviewees felt an implicit trade-off was eventually made in favor of focusing on short-term atrocity prevention in 2013.

2. Key Factors Aiding or Impeding Effectiveness

A. Contextual Factors

Interviewees felt contextual factors played a much bigger role in explaining why atrocities were prevented. When asked why 2013 was so peaceful, very few interviewees cited “peace

messaging” or similar programming that was being undertaken during the pre-election period. Indeed, it was noted that people still had their machetes ready, and violence had only shifted from the streets to social media. Instead, it was a series of contextual factors that were provided as an explanation. These include the following: (a) the formation of the Jubilee Coalition; (b) the ICC, which served as a deterrent for high level potential perpetrators and inspired a sense of nationalism that unified much of the populace; (c) the still-fresh memory of 2007/08, which no one wanted to experience again; (d) confidence in the judiciary and the IEBC; (e) the (self)-censorship of the media; and (f) the absence of an incumbent in the presidential contest.

B. Internal Factors

Donor funding came too late in the lead-up to 2013. The timing of funding was a challenge expressed by nearly everyone interviewed. Programming was ramped up in mid/late-2011, and donors received their last big tranches of funding at the end of 2012. This had a significant impact on the ability to do a comprehensive rollout of programming such as EWER, hate speech monitoring and, in particular, civic education. It also caused the focus to shift from long-term conflict mitigation to, as one interviewee called it, “putting a band aid on the wound.” Temporary solutions were instilled for the much-needed long-term reforms, and issues such as land reforms, youth unemployment, or even confidence building in institutions were not comprehensively addressed. Such limited time-lines for program implementation also meant that there was a dearth of structures in place for follow-up during the post-election period.

Views are mixed on the role of technology in programming. The mobilization of technology played an important role in atrocity prevention efforts in Kenya, and was largely drawn from recommendations established in the Kriegler report. Interviewees acknowledged the significance of biometric voter-registration (BVR) kits and the electronic transmission of results in building confidence in the IEBC. However, they also recognized that a reliance on the latest, most expensive, logistically complicated technology as a fail-safe measure against fraud was misplaced. This was particularly true given the lessons learned by Ghana when BVR kits failed in their December 2012 polls. Interviewees recognized that the failure of these technologies in Kenya could have easily sparked violence.

C. External Factors

There is a general sense of agreement that donor and programming coordination was relatively good in the lead-up to the 2013 elections. This commitment to collaborate was spurred by the shock generated by the 2007/08 post-election violence. Interviewees pointed to regular coordination meetings, thematic working groups on democratic governance and elections, technical secretariats, and regular ambassadorial meetings as key mechanisms that allowed the donors to speak with one voice in their engagement with the Kenyan government and integrate atrocity prevention efforts across various sectors. USAID’s regional working groups (e.g. Rift Valley, Coast), which brought together international implementers and local actors as well, were singled out as particularly beneficial. All that said, several interviewees felt that donors may have spent too much time coordinating that they lost sight of the bigger picture.

Still, duplication of programming was a concern. Interviewees questioned why, if coordination was so good, donors funded upwards of 30 separate civil society platforms focused on civic education, election observation and EWER in the lead-up to the 2013

elections. This also had implications for civil society, which interviewees indicated was fairly united 18 months out from polls, but became more fragmented and selfish over time due to competition for resources. Interviewees felt that more could be done with less if there had been better coordination (e.g. not everyone needed a peace caravan in Rift Valley). Several donor representatives suggested the need for improved donor matrices to facilitate collaboration.

Local networks were not utilized effectively. Several interviewees expressed concern that donors were channeling money to their “golden horse” organizations or setting up parallel networks instead of community-based organizations doing good work at the grassroots level or already established networks. Peace messaging was cited as an example of this, with representatives from Nairobi telling local communities what their messaging would say versus tapping into these groups to identify priority issues and craft appropriate messaging. One interviewee indicated that the only way for an implementer to succeed is to employ local people who speak the local language and have access to government.

Lack of political will from the Government of Kenya was identified as a major obstacle preventing the implementation of programming aimed at long-term conflict mitigation. Interviewees agreed that while the political will was there to avoid a repeat of 2007/08, the same cannot be said for efforts to address the long-standing grievances that drive conflict in Kenya.

3. Unintended Positive or Negative Effects of Programming & Reasoning

A trade-off was seemingly made between peace and democracy. A number of interviewees pointed out pervasive problems associated with the administration of the 2013 election. Evidence of IEBC mismanagement of the polls continues to come to light, most recent being the “Chickengate” scandal. Furthermore, the ruling issued by the Supreme Court on the CORD/Africog election results petition was seen as rushed and legally weak. However, in the name of peace, the results were ultimately accepted. Thus, self-censorship in the name of peace took precedence over critical discussion about the credibility of the electoral process. Likewise, an enforced silence about other key issues associated with underlying drivers of the conflict was pervasive across multiple sectors, namely the media, civil society, political opposition, and international observers. Dissent or debate was perceived as risking the incitement of violence. Interviewees generally felt there may have been “too much peace,” with one also noting, “people should not be blackmailed into peace.” Many also felt that effective civic education could have played an important role in giving citizens confidence that they could be bold without inciting violence.

As a result of these real but suppressed concerns, confidence in key institutions, namely the IEBC and the judiciary, that was crucial for Kenya to avoid atrocities in 2013 has taken a big hit. Several interviewees expressed the belief that Kenya was largely back to square one with both of these institutions, and if future poll results were contested, it is unlikely that Kenyans would go to the courts again. This has serious implications for the prospects of violence in 2017. As one interviewee noted, “if you don’t trust institutions, you take to the streets.”

2013 also left Kenya severely polarized along ethnic lines. These divisions were described in interviews as the Jubilee Coalition—Kikuyu and Kalenjin—versus everyone else. Furthermore, reports from human rights groups indicate that militia groups in Central, Nyanza,

Nairobi, Coast, Rift Valley, and parts of North Eastern, such as Mungiki, remain armed despite the Prevention of Organized Crimes Act (2009) and are actually proliferating. Furthermore, the Jubilee Coalition itself, described by interviewees as “a marriage of convenience,” is fragile, especially given recent ICC-related developments, i.e. Kenyatta’s case being withdrawn. The majority of interviewees indicated that if Ruto is convicted, “Kenya will go up in flames.” Interviewees felt there had been little “dialogue on difficult issues” or reconciliation to bring the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities together at the local level.

Furthermore, there is concern that devolution is further entrenching ethnic politics and corruption. Interviewees indicated that Kenyan politicians now recognize that a county assembly seat is a lucrative thing to hold, increasing competition for power at the local level. Furthermore, frustration was high with county government corruption and politically motivated officials being that much closer to instigating constituents into violence. A number of interviewees cited a World Bank report that found less than 10% of devolved funds being spent on development.³⁸ If not managed properly, the way in which devolution is being implemented raises the likelihood of local-level conflict with upcoming party nomination processes, etc.

Finally, political messaging also had a negative impact. Interviewees pointed specifically to A/S Carson’s “choices have consequences” statement. By conflating the ICC cases and the election, the United States was perceived as biased against the Jubilee Coalition, something the party took advantage of throughout the inter-election period.

4. Longevity of Programming

Very little programming conducted in the lead-up to the 2013 elections remains operational. Interviewees noted that after donors did a “touchdown dance” in 2013, attention, and resources, shifted elsewhere or was diverted to economic growth and trade programming. Consequently, funding for governance and human rights work has declined significantly. A number of interviewees raised concerns about the sustainability of the peace infrastructure put in place (e.g. DPCs, youth bungalows, EWER systems) as a result of this withdrawal. The USG is almost singly focused on devolution at present, but in isolation from conflict mitigation. Furthermore, real strategizing about 2017 has yet to take place. It appears that DFID will have election-related funding available starting later this year, but the other donors won’t be in a similar position until 2016.

VI. BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED

1. For Other At-Risk Countries on the Continent

As evident in the key findings from program mapping and stakeholder interviews, the Kenyan experience involved a set of unique circumstances that may not translate in other at-risk situations on the continent and elsewhere. These include its status as a strategic country in the region for the international community, the involvement of the ICC, and a recent experience with mass violence. However, the following best practices and lessons learned are worth the consideration of the Atrocities Prevention Board and other USG actors operating in other pre-election contexts:

³⁸ Wahome, Mwaniki (February 5, 2015)

Prioritize Investing in Institutions. The Kenyan experience demonstrates the significance of an effective and independent electoral management body and judiciary in mitigating the risk of election-related violence. If citizens have confidence in the integrity of the electoral process, they are less likely to resort to violence. If they have faith in their judicial institutions, they will bring grievances to the courts rather than the streets. The importance of addressing “state institution risk factors” is also echoed in USAID’s *Electoral Security Framework*. However, the Kenyan experience also demonstrates how fragile these institutions can be and that a sustained investment is necessary.

Ensure Effective Donor and Implementer Coordination. As observed from the Kenyan experience, close coordination and collaboration among key actors contributes to the effectiveness of interventions. Donor working groups allow for joint conflict analysis, planning and implementation of activities, and common positions. Similarly close coordination among implementing partners can establish important synergies across activities that expand the reach and impact of existing programming. This coordination should extend to the sub-national level as well. Tactical or working group-level coordination may be more effective than larger forums.

Expand Political Presence Beyond the Capital. The Kenyan experience suggests that political officers outside of capital cities can be a key resource for generating a more accurate rolling sub-national conflict analysis and relationship building that is not typically produced by staff based in the Embassy. In order to be effective, this type of deployment should be long enough to allow officers time to build trust with local communities ahead of elections and then to ensure an effective handover afterwards. Where safety concerns do not allow for this kind of presence in potential hot spots, partnerships should be established with local organizations.

Build Flexibility into Programming and Budgets. Project development in Kenya reveals that countries prone to political violence present dynamic political environments that require adaptive programmatic responses. Committing rigidly to a single strategic course can result in ineffective prevention programming when initial assumptions and analysis become outdated. Flexible rapid response mechanisms, like OTI or CSO, should be expanded and strengthened.

Atrocity Prevention Necessitates A Sustained Investment. As manifest in the Kenyan context, enduring peace does not result from a single election without mass violence, but rather from a long-term commitment to conflict mitigation. Quick-burst interventions around an election encourage strategies that address short-term electoral violence concerns at the expense of the underlying conflict drivers, with serious consequences for the potential of future violence. Funding cycles should be realigned to make support for peaceful elections part of a larger, long-term strategy of support for conflict mitigation. This could potentially involve the creation of a new presidential initiative, like Power Africa.

A Country’s Own Political Will for Long-Term Atrocity Prevention is Key. Efforts during the inter-election period reveal that while appropriate institutional designs and legal frameworks are essential, none of this will matter unless there is the political will of the host government to make these mechanisms work in practice and press on with the reforms necessary for long-term conflict mitigation. Pressure from the public and exposure from the media is important. But equally so is sustained international pressure that demonstrates the costs of resisting reforms to avoid mass atrocities exceed the benefits. Strategic political messaging matters here.

Technology is Not a Cure All. The 2013 elections demonstrates that while technology can play an important role in atrocity prevention efforts—such as the electronic transmission of election results, online hate speech monitoring, and peace messaging by SMS and social media—poorly employed technological solutions can actually increase tensions or even potentially spark violence. Programming that includes the use of technology should be informed by local needs and capacities, not the other way around. It may be that lower-tech solutions are more appropriate. Furthermore, effective implementation should start early to ensure ample time for testing before public deployment.

Appropriate EWER Model Selection Matters. As evidenced through programming in Kenya, there were feedback loop challenges associated with a national level EWER model. It may be that community-level mechanisms that draw their strength from relationships between relevant local actors are most effective. EWER programming should be informed by a thorough analysis of the existing peace and security infrastructure. Investment should be made in strengthening local response capacities as well as in developing and testing feedback loops from warning to response in advance of an election.

Minimize the Tradeoff between Promoting Peace and Promoting Democracy. The Kenyan experience demonstrates the implications of making a tradeoff between peace and democratic politics for the prospect of violence in the longer-term. Legitimate dissent and debate are key elements of a democracy. Civic education programming should be given equal priority to peace messaging to ensure citizens feel well informed but also confident in their ability to express differing views and debate core issues or an election outcome without inciting violence.

2. For Kenya

The above best practices and lessons learned are equally important for the U.S. government to keep in mind in Kenya as the 2017 elections approach. Additional Kenya-specific recommendations include:

Embed Conflict-Sensitive Approaches in U.S. Support for Devolved Institutions. Applying a conflict lens to the USAID’s Agile Harmonized Assistance for Devolved Institutions (AHADI) program will be important for ensuring that assistance aimed at enhancing Kenya’s capacity to implement devolution refrains from exacerbating existing conflict dynamics in the country. The U.S. government should consider adding a conflict advisor to key AHADI personnel to train implementing partners and provide ongoing support and monitoring.

Make Current U.S. Support for Devolved Institutions Part of a More Holistic Assistance Strategy to Strengthen Democratic Institutions, Improve Governance, and Protect Human Rights in Kenya. Although devolution can go a long way in addressing long-standing grievances associated with unequal distribution of power and resources, it is not a panacea. It is therefore important to also address other structural drivers of conflict now versus later. This includes assistance aimed at building a better and more credible electoral commission, judicial and security sector reform, land reform, and justice and reconciliation.

Ensure U.S. Foreign Assistance for the 2017 Elections Is Available As Soon As Possible. Limited funding levels currently constrain the ability of the U.S. to address a larger set of issues. Washington should push to make funding for the 2017 elections available in 2015.

Advocate for an Enabling Environment for Civil Society. Civil society in Kenya has a key role to play in long-term atrocity prevention in Kenya, including facilitating dialogue, advocating for the advancement of the reform agenda, and holding the Government of Kenya accountable. However, new legislation raises serious concerns about shrinking democratic space in the country. The U.S. government, in cooperation with the larger donor community, should continue to advocate for an enabling environment for civil society, both publically and in private discussions with senior Kenyan officials, as well as commit to continued financial and technical support for local organizations.

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World Bank Database, “GDP per capita” Indicator

ANNEX 1: List of Interviews

1	AID/DRG
2	AID/OTI
3	Amnesty International
4	CIDA
5	CRECO
6	DAI
7	DFID
8	DoD
9	Freedom House
10	GIZ
11	Global Communities
12	HRW
13	ICJ-Kenya
14	ICTJ
15	IFES
16	iHub
17	Internews
18	IRI
19	KHRC
20	KNHRC
21	KPTJ
22	Mercy Corps
23	NDI
24	NED
25	NSC
26	Pact
27	PILPG
28	S/AFR
29	S/DRL
30	S/GCJ
31	S/INR
32	Sisi Ni Amani
33	TJRC
34	UNDP
35	Uraia Trust
36	US Embassy
37	Ushahidi
38	USIP

ANNEX 2. Mapping: Conflict Mitigation

IMPLEMENTER	PROGRAM	DATES	DONOR	FUNDING	GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE	THEME					
						EW ER	Deter Spoilers	Peace Messaging	Community Dialogue & Reconciliation	Hate Speech Monitoring	Capacitating Local Peace Structures
Mercy Corps	Champions of Peace (CoP)		S/CSO	\$241,503		x			x		x
National Steering Committee (NSC) of the Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security	Consolidating the Peace Processes and Establishing Foundations for a Successful Political Transition in Kenya	2010-2013	Norway, Sweden, DfID, UNDP	\$15 million	national and local level	x			x		x
Office of the President, National Secretariat Conflict Management	District Peace Committee	2011-2012	UNDP	\$ 2.525 million	Northern, Coast						x

and Peace Building.											
DAI	Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI)	2007-2011	USAID/OTI	\$32 million+	Mombasa, North Rift, Rift Valley (Office: Nairobi, Eldoret, Kericho)	x	x	x	x	x	x
Chemonics International	Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) II	2011-2013									
CHF International, Center for Legal Empowerment, Peace-Net Kenya	Kenya Tuna Uwezo	2012-2014	USAID	\$1.6 million	Eight informal settlements of Nairobi (Kiambiu, Kibera, Korogocho/Bab adogo, Mathare, Dandora, Kangemi, Majengo, and Mukuru) and Eastleigh		x	x	x		x
Internews	Land & Conflict Sensitive Journalism	2010-2013	USAID	\$2.3 million	Nairobi, Rift Valley, Coast and Nyanza provinces				x	x	
Pact	Kenya Civil Society Strengtheni	2006-2013	USAID	\$ 35.5 million	Nationwide	x	x	x	x	x	x

	ng Project (KCSSP)										
Picha Mtaani	Picha Mtaani	2008-2011	UNDP	\$672,500	Nationwide			x	x		
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC), Mount Elgon Residents Association (MERA)	Strengthening Non-State Actors' Capacities to Prevent and Resolve Conflicts in Areas Affected by Post Election Violence in Kenya	2009-2011	EU	972.126,00 €		x			x		
Search for Common Ground, Media Focus on Africa	The Team	2008-2012	USAID, DfID, GoK, EU				x	x			
PeaceNet-Kenya (a coalition of local organizations)	UWIANO Platform for Peace		Sweden, DfID, UN		Nakuru, Molo, Eldoret, Kitale	x		x	x		x

CLUSA International, Mercy Corps, World Vision, Winrock International, Education Development Center	Yes Youth Can!	2011- 2015	USAID	\$55 million	30 (out of 47) counties		x				x
Mercy Corps	Local Empower ment for Peace (LEAP)	2010- 2013	USAID	\$2.7 million	6 counties in Rift Valley(Uasin Gishu, Kericho, Nandi, Nakuru, Trans Nzoia and Bomet)	x	x		x		x
Catholic Relief Services	People to People Peace Project (3Ps)	2010- 2012	USAID	\$599.69	Burnt Forest, Kuresoi, Likoni.				x		x
Forum Syd, etc.	Drivers of Accountabi lity Programm e (DAP)	2010- 2015	DFID, DANID A, CIDA	£35.6 million		x					x
	ACPP: Kenya Conflict Prevention	2010- 2011	DFID	£1.5 million		x	x				

	Programme										
Kenya based NGOs, UNDP	Africa Crisis Prevention Pool	2008-2010	DFID	£3 million			x		x		
Equal Rights Trust (ERT), Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA), Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC),	Empowering Disadvantaged Group Through Combating Discrimination and Promoting Equality	2009-2010	DFID	£83,074			x				x
Kenya based NGOs, INGOs, Transparency International	Political Empowerment Project	2000-2010	DFID	£7.5 million			x		x		
International Rescue Committee	Peace Initiative Kenya (PIK)	2012-2013	USAID	\$3.2 million	Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifi, Tana River, Lamu, Taita Taveta, Migori, Kisii, Kisumu, Bomet, Nakuru, Narok, Kaijado, Uasin Gishu, TransNzoia,		x		x		x

					West Pokot, Mt. Elgon, Nairobi						
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Table 2. Mapping: Election Management

IMPLEMENTER	PROGRAM	DATES	DONOR	FUNDING	GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE	THEME			
						Civic and Voter Education	Professionalizing Political Parties	Capacity Building the Election Management Body	Election Observation
Election Observation Group (ELOG)	Enhancing stakeholders' Knowledge and Awareness on Electoral Issues					x			
	Strengthening the ELOG Group's institutional and infrastructural Framework						x	x	
	Thematic Observation of the Electoral Process					x		x	x
	E-Day Observation								x
	Promotion of modern Technology Based Methodologies in Election Observation							x	x

	General Observation								x
	Participation in Regional Elections Observation and Electoral developments								x
NDI, IRI, IFES	Kenya Election and Political Process Strengthening Program	2011-2015	USAID	23.26 million USD	Nationwide	x	x	x	
UNDP	Support to Electoral Reforms and Processes	2012-2013	UNDP, EU, Netherlands, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Italy, UKaid, USAID	30 million USD	Nationwide	x		x	
DAI	Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI)	2007-2011	USAID/O TI	\$32 million+	Mombasa, North Rift, Rift Valley (Office: Nairobi, Eldoret, Kericho)	x	x	x	x
Chemonics International	Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) II	2011-2013				x	x	x	x

NGOs, UNDP	Elections Management and Security	2012-2013	DFID	£13 million	nationwide			x	
UNDP	Support to Kenya Electoral Reforms	2010-2012	CIDA	\$350,000		x	x	x	x
UNDP	Free and Fair Elections in Kenya	2012-2014	CIDA	\$2,900,000		x		x	
Well Told Story	Shujaaz.FM Multimedia Youth	2011-2013	USAID	\$1.1 million	Nationwide	x			
Mathare Youth Sports Association (MYSA)	Soccer Tournament		S/CSO	\$23,330		x			
UNDP, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission, Google Kenya, the Kenya Premier League, the Kenya Football Federation, Athletics Kenya and the	Sports 4 Peaceful Elections Campaign		UNDP		national	x			

Kenya Rugby Union									
Inuka Kenya Trust	Uongozi	2012-2014	USAID	\$1.6 million	Nationwide	x			
Uraia Trust	Uraia Trust Civic Education Program	2012-2014	USAID	\$961,564	Nationwide	x			

